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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~lARY J. HO\YARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Corporation, and HORACE BY-
INGTON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF 'l,HE CASE 
This action arose out of an autombile accident which 
occurred on October 19, 1951 in the vicinity of the bridge 
over Red Creek on U. S. Highway 40, about 22 miles west 
of Duchesne, Utah. On that date Francis A. Howard, 
accompanied by his son, Allen Howard, was driving a 
Willys Pickup truck in an easterly direction along said 
highway. As the pickup truck crossed the bridge over 
Red Creek, it struck the side of the bridge, continued on 
up the highway 80 to 100 feet, and then suddenly veered 
over onto the wrong side of the highway and in front of 
the defendant's truck, which had been approaching said 
point from the opposite direction. 
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The defendant's truck collided with the Jeep at a 
point on defendant's side of the highway near the north 
edge of the same. Francis A. Howard and Allen Howard 
died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision. 
This action is brought by Mary J. Howard, the wife of 
Francis A. I-Ioward and mother of Allen Howard to 
recover damages by reason of their death. At the con-
clusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial judge directed 
a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the ground that 
plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case. It 
is undisputed that there was no evidence of negligence 
on the part of the defendant before the pickup truck 
collided with the side of the bridge and then came over 
onto the defendant's side of the highway. The sole issue 
presented by the appellant's brief is; Was the plaintiff 
entitled, under the evidence, to have the case considered 
by the jury upon the theory that the defendant had the 
"last clear chance" to avoid the accident~ We will confine 
our statement of facts and argument to that issue. 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
The highway in the vicinity of the accident runs in 
a generally northwest and southeast direction. (Exhibits 
1 Reproduced herein for the convenience of the court and 
19). Red Creek bridge is located near the bottom of a 
gully or ravine through which Red Creek flows (Exhibit 
1 and 19). The road approaching the bridge from the 
northwest is down hill at a grade of from 7.3% to 3.6% 
in the vicinity of the bridge. The road approaching the 
bridge from the southeast is down hill at a grade of 
approximately 6%. Near the southeast end of the bridge, 
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a dirt road intersects the highway on the south side 
(Exhibit 1 and 19). Directly across the highway frmn 
this dirt road is a wide turn out area (Exhibit 1). The 
oiled surface of the highway is 22 feet wide (R. 35). The 
bridge is somewhat narrower and is 20.4 feet wide (R. 
35). \Y e have printed two views of the scene, taken sorne 
months after the accident to acquaint the court with the 
general scene. (See Exhibits SA & 11.) 
On the south side of the bridge near the southeast 
end were fresh scuff marks which appeared to have been 
made by the tire of the Jeep scraping along the sides of 
the bridge (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) (R. 31). Leading off the 
southeast end of the bridge on the south shoulder of the 
road, tire marks extended for a distance of about 75 to 
90 feet where they veered off to the north side of the 
highway (Exhibit 1, R. 35-36). A line made by some 
liquid extended down the south side of the highway for 
a distance of 100 feet where it suddenly turned across 
the highway (R. 91-95). (See also Exhibits 2, 3, 6 & 7 
printed here for the convenience of the court.) The point 
of ilnpact was some 225 feet from the marks on the south-
east side of the bridge (R. 32), near the north edge of the 
traveled or oil surface of the highway (R. 26). 
The defendant's truck was loaded with explosives 
and was traveling northeast toward Salt Lake City. As it 
approached the scene of the accident, it was traveling 
-15 _miles per hour ( R. 41). After the impact, it came to 
rest :25 feet off the north side of the highway 135 feet 
from the point of impact (R. 24 & 25), in the turn out 
area on the north side of the highway. 
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The record is silent as to why the Jeep went out of 
control and hit the south side of the bridge. There is no 
evidence of the speed at which the Jeep was traveling as 
it approached the bridge, unless we can infer that it was 
going at a high rate of speed from the fact that it 
apparently went out of control, struck the bridge and 
then cut over on the wrong side of the highway. Nor was 
there any evidence of what would have been a reasonable 
speed or the speed limit on the highway. 
The only eye witness to the accident was the driver 
of defendant's vehicle, Horace Byington, who was not 
called to testify. The driver told the patrolman, Glen 
Wing, in substance that he observed the Jeep hit the 
south side of the bridge and then continue on down the 
highway (R. 29). He was supposed to have told Brady 
Howard that it looked like the Jeep hit the corner of the 
bridge and then went out of control and had cut cross-
wise across the highway and that he did not see it any 
more until he felt the impact (R. 115). 
Dr. Harris, an expert called by plaintiff, testified that 
defendant's vehicle could have been brought to a stop 
.;;tfter the brakes had been applied sufficiently to lay down 
skid marks in 130 feet (R. 148); That the time it would 
take an ordinary driver to apply his brakes after he 
realized the danger would be % of the second, reaction ·,; I 
time, during which time the defendant's truck, at a speed 
of 45 miles per hour, would have traveled an additional 
50 feet, for a total of 180 fe_et (R. 150). Continuing on, 
the doctor testified (R. 150): 
"Q. Of course, Doctor, in a situation, assuming, 
-4 
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EXHIBIT 8-A. LOOKING SOUTH-EAST. 
£XHl8fT-11 .. LOOK~G NORTH-WEST. 
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iExhibit 6. Shows marks leading 
1 across L • - -L·-·-·· 
I 
·~ . 
...... 
Exhibit 3. Shows tire marks on 
shoulder of highway and 
across highway. 
Exhibit 7. Shows marks leading 
across highway. 
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Doctor, that the driver of this truck is coming 
down that grade and sees ahead of him going 
east, he is traveling 'vest, sees ahead of him 
a jeep truck or a vehicle hit a bridge and go 
out of control and travel along the shoulder 
of the highway for son1e distance before it 
suddenly cut over to his side of the road, in 
addition to reaction time wouldn't you also 
have perception tin1e? In other words, 
wouldn't that person first have to see the 
emergency which would take him the reaction 
tiine that was there and then form a judgment 
as to what he was going to do about it~ 
\Y ouldn 't you have that in there, too~ 
A. You mean to take time for him to make up his 
mind just what he wanted to do~ 
Q. Yes. In other words, he would have his re-
action time; it would take him the reaction 
time to see the thing and realize what was 
happening and then you would also have a 
little more time for him to judge or perceive 
what he was going to do about it~ 
A. He might need time to do that, yes. 
Q. And if you have a judgment time it might be 
two or three seconds~ 
A. Well, he might not apply the brakes at all, 
which might be many seconds. 
Q. In other words, if he had a large load of ex-
plosives and he sees the vehicle coming and 
isn't sure which way it finally might go it 
might take him two or three seconds to decide 
what to do about it~ 
A. It would take time. It might take him two or 
three seconds. 
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Q. In other words you have what you would call 
judgment time~ 
A. 1 would call it judgment time." 
STArrEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I. 
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO A SITUATION WHERE THE OTHER PARTY'S 
NEGLIGENCE OR CONDUCT CONTINUES UP TO THE 
POINT OF IMP ACT. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE REQUIRED 
A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY TO A VOID THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT NO. III. 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A LAST CLEAR 
CHANCE TO AVOID THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ANY NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO A SITUATION WHERE THE OTHER PARTY'S 
NEGLIGENCE OR CONDUCT CONTINUES UP TO THE 
POINT OF IMPACT. 
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is only applicable 
to a situation where the plaintiff's or injured person's 
negligence has subjected himself to a risk of harm from 
which he is unable to extricate himself by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence and care. The Doctrine does not 
apply to a situation where the defendant's negligence or 
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conduct, which is a proximate cause of the accident con-
' tinues up to the point of impact. The first requirement 
of the Doctrine is whether, as stated by the restatement 
of the Law of Torts \T ol. 2, Sec. 479, Page 1253: 
'·a. The plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exer-
cise of reasonable vigilance and care and," 
In the case of Watkins v. Utah Poultry a.nd Farmers 
Co-op, (Utah) 251 P 2d 663, where the court's failure to 
instruct on last clear chance where plaintiff's car was 
driven onto the wrong side of the highway was discussed, 
the court said on Page 668 : 
"Under the facts, there are just two possible 
situations to which the above request could reason-
ably be considered to apply. The first would be 
under the assumption that the plaintiff was keep-
ing on his own side of the road. That circum-
stance is adequately covered by other instructions 
advising the jury of the defendant's duty to travel 
on its own side of the road and that failure to do 
so would be negligence, which, coupled with proxi-
mate cause, would permit plaintiff to recover. The 
other would be under the assumption that the 
plaintiff came over onto the wrong side of the 
road, and the plaintiff wanted the court to tell the 
jury that even though he crossed over onto the 
'vrong side of the highway, he could nevertheless 
recover if the defendant saw or should have seen 
him and thereafter in the exercise of reasonable 
care he had a 'clear chance' to avoid the collision. 
'rhis contention is answered by the analysis of 
'last clear chance' as contained in the case of 
Compton v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Company, where we approved the doctrine as set 
forth in sections 479 and 480 of the Restatement 
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of rrorts. In the instant case, the plaintiff's negli-
gence would not have come to rest, and defend-
ant's driver could not possibly have been aware 
that plaintiff was inattentive; so at best, even 
under plaintiff's theory and taking his interpreta-
tion of the evidence, we would have had the con-
curring negligence of the plaintiff and defendant 
resulting in the collision, under which circum-
stances there could be no recovery." 
In Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot CompOJI'Iiy, 
(Utah) 235 P 2d 515 on Page 518, the court said: 
"We have never held that a mere continuance 
of the same inattentive negligence created a situa-
tion of inextricable peril. When the injured per-
son's negligence has not come to rest, as it had in 
the above case~, so that by the exercise of reason-
able care she would have been able to avoid the 
peril at any time up to the moment of injury, the 
injury is then the result of the concurring negli-
gence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The one 
was just as much the proximate cause as the other. 
Ryan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 
71. Harper on Torts, Sec. 139, Page 306, considers 
the situation of the negligent defendant and the 
negligent plaintiff where the defendant is un-
aware of plaintiff's peril and states: '* * * It 
follows, thus, that the doctrine of last clear chance 
does not include cases in which a plaintiff has the 
physical and mental ability to avoid the risk up 
to the moment of the harm. His "continuing" 
negligence, as it is sometimes called, continues to 
insulate the defendant's negligence, and the ordi-
nary rule of contributory negligence governs the 
case.'" 
The evidence in this case shows that Francis A. 
Howard, beginning at a point 80-100 feet from the point 
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·I 
where he had collided with the bridge and 145-125 feet 
from the point of impact, left the shoulder of the south 
side of the highway and drove his jeep diagonally across 
the highway into the path of the defendant's vehicle. 
There can be no question that this conduct, either negli-
gent or otherwise, was the proximate cause of his own 
and his son's injury. At any ti1ne, up to almost the very 
instant of impact, he could have avoided the collision by 
remaining on his own proper side of the highway. We 
are presented with a very fluid situation in which the 
position of the two aut~mobiles was changing very rapid-
ly from moment to moment. The deceased's conduct 
never came to rest until the very instant of hnpact and, 
since it continued up to that point, the doctrine of last 
clear chance has no application to the facts of this case. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE REQUIRED 
A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY TO A VOID THE ACCIDENT. 
Before the doctrine of last clear chance can be in-
voked, it must appear that the defendant had a fair and a 
clear opportunity to avoid the injury. In the recent case 
of Cox v. Thompson, (Utah) 254 P 2d 1047, this court 
said: 
"The last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable 
in the present instance. In order for the question 
of last clear chance to be properly submitted to a 
jury the evidence must be such as would in all 
probability reasonahly support a finding that 
there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care, to avoid the injury. It 
would not be sufficient that it appear from hind-
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sight that by some possible measure the defendant 
by the 'skin of his teeth' could have avoided the 
injury. See Morby v. Rogers, (Utah) 252 P 2d 
231. 
"This court has adopted as a rule in this state 
the la:::;t clear chance doctrine of Sections 4 79 and 
480 of the Restatement of Torts. See Compton et 
al v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co., supra. Sec-
tion 480 reads: 
" 'A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reason-
able vigilance could have observed the danger 
created by the defendant's negligence in time to 
have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but 
only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's 
situation, and (b) realized or had reason to realize 
that the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore 
unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the 
harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to 
utilize with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing ability to avoid harming the plain-
tiff.' 
* * * * 
"Thus the matter was properly withheld from 
the jury if the evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably 
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant 
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff was 
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b) 
inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in 
time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant was 
thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with rea-
sonable care and competence his then existing 
ability to avoid harming decedent." 
As was said in Compton v. Ogden Union Railway & 
Depot Co., (Utah) 235 P 2d 515: 
10 
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''The rule approved by this court where plain-
tiff is negligently inattentive and has subjected 
hin1self to risk of harm as provided in Section 480 
is that he can recover from a defendant who lmew 
of his situation and realized or had reason to real-
ize that plaintiff is inattentive, and unlikely to' 
disron'r his peril in time to avoid harm, and there-
after is negligent in failing to use ordinary care 
with the means at his disposal to avoid harming 
hin1. For the rule to be otherwise, we would again 
only have the negligence of the plaintiff and de-
fendant concurring together to proximately cause 
the injury. * * * 
"In the principal case in order for plaintiffs 
to make out a case of last clear chance, it would 
have been necessary that the defendant know that 
decedent was in a position of peril, and in addition 
have realized or had reason to realize that de-
cedent was inattentive and unlikely to discover 
her peril in time to avoid the threatened harm, 
and defendant must thereafter have fa,iled to ex-
ercise reasonable· care in connection with its then 
existing ability to avoid harming decedent." 
(Italics ours) 
Not only must the evidence show that the defendant 
had an opportunity to avoid the accident after he be-
comes or has reason to be aware of plaintiff's negligence, 
but the opportunity must be shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 
The case of Graham v. Johnson, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, 
109 Utah 346, involved the opportunity of a defendant 
to avoid injury to a thirteen year old boy playing ball in 
the street. The court said: 
""'' * * But in the last clear chance doctrine 
11 
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the word 'clear' has significance. In a case such 
as this when both parties are more or less rapidly 
changing their positions the evidence must be clear 
and convincing that the party whom it is claimed 
could have avoided the accident had a 'clear' 
chance to do so. 
"One should not be held liable for failing to 
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a situ-
ation where it is speculative as to whether he was 
afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In a situ-
ation where both parties are on the move the sig-
nificance of the word 'clear' is most important. 
Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the 
effect of one's negligence on a party not negli-
gent. That party's negligence only arises when 
it is definitely established that there was ample 
time and opportunity to avoid the accident which 
was not taken advantage of." 
POINT NO. III. 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A LAST CLEAR 
CHANCE TO A VOID THE ACCIDENT. 
Appellant's argument that the defendant driver could 
have avoided the accident is pure speculation and is not 
based on any facts which are supported by the evidence 
in this case, or any presumption of law, which may apply. 
In making certain mathematical calculations which ap-
pear in their brief they admittedly, without any basis, 
ask the court to assume that the vehicle driven by Francis 
Howard was traveling at a speed of 45 miles per hour 
at the time it struck the bridge abutment. There is no di-
rect evidence of the speed at which the vehicle was travel-
ing, nor is there any evidence of what would have been 
a reasonable speed limit in this area, if we presume that 
12 
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at 
the Jeep was being driven at a reasonable speed. An 
inference that the Jeep was traveling at a high rate of 
speed may be drawn from the fact that Francis A. How-
ard had so little control of his vehicle that he permitted 
the same to first strike the side of the bridge and then 
yeered on over onto the wrong side of the road. In the face 
of such evidence, the presumption that he was exercising 
due care disappears fron1 this case, for as was said in 
Cox v. Thompson, supra: 
"If the presumption that a person in a place 
of danger exercises due care for his own safety 
applies in this case, it will be extinguished if the 
evidence properly sustains the finding that the de-
cedent was contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law." 
Of course, if the Jeep were being driven at a high 
and excessive rate of speed, there can be no question that 
the Jeep would cover the distance between the point 
where it cut across the road and the point of impact so 
quickly that the defendant would have no opportunity 
to avoid striking the Jeep. 
Even if we presume that the vehicle driven by Fran-
cis A. Howard was traveling at a reasonable speed, such 
a presumption does not support an assumption that he 
was traveling at a rate of 45 miles per hour, the assump-
tion on which all of the defendant's mathematical compu-
tations are based. Since the collision occurred on an open 
road in an area outside any municipality or town, it would 
ordinarily be governed by the State's speed limit of 60 
miles per hour, which is defined by statutes as prima 
facie reasonable. If we are to engage in unwarranted as-
13 
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sumptions and speculation, it is as reasonable to assume 
that the Jeep was traveling at a speed of 60 miles per 
hour, or any other speed, as it is to assume that the Jeep 
was traveling 45 miles per hour; and it is submitted that 
we cannot arbitrarily, in the absence of any evidence, 
make any assumptions which are not warranted by the 
evidence and then use the assumed facts as a basis for 
certain mathematical calculations in arriving at a deci-
sion in this matter. 
The vehicle driven by Francis A. Howard and that 
of the defendant were approaching each other from op-
posite directions. The rate at which the distance of which 
the two vehicles was closing would be the combined rate 
of speed of the two vehicles. To illustrate; if the vehicles 
were both traveling 45 miles per hour, the distance be-
tween them would be reduced at the rate of 90 miles per 
hour, or 132 feet per second. If one were traveling 60 and 
the other 45, the distance between them would be reduced 
at the rate of 159 feet per second. The evidence shows 
that the two vehicles were at the most only 125-150 feet 
apart at the time the Jeep cut from its side of the road 
over onto the path of the defendant's vehicle. At the 
rate the distance was closing between the two automo-
biles, if the Jeep was traveling at any speed at all, there 
was available to the defendant only a second or two in 
which he might have stopped his automobile or otherwise 
acted to avoid the collision. 
Not only are the mathematical computations cited 
by the appellant based on assumptions which were not 
warranted by the evidence, but they also ignore the fact 
14 
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that the Jeep remained on it8 own side of the highway for 
a distance of fr01n ~U-100 feet after crossing the bridge, 
and prior to c01ning diagonally across the highway to the 
point of impact. The driver of the defendant's car would 
have been entitled to assmnP that Francis A. Howard 
would remain on his own side of the highway until it be-
carne apparent that he would not do so. At least, it can-
not be reasonably said that he had a duty to make a 
violent application of his brakes, or take any other dras-
tic action to avoid a collision, until such conduct became 
apparent. Therefore, it is misleading to say that the de-
fendant driver had the time that it would have taken the 
Jeep pickup to travel 225 feet at whatever speed it was 
traveling, in which to detennine and execute a course of 
action. The time would be that tin1e it would require the 
Jeep to travel 120-145 feet. Returning again to the table 
and illustrations cited by the appellant, it would only re-
quire the Jeep moving at a speed of 45 miles per hour less 
than two seconds to travel 120 feet at -±5 miles per hour, 
and about 2.2 seconds to travel145 feet. At 60 miles per 
hour, this distance would have been covered in less than 
2 seconds. This means that the defendant barely had 
sufficient ti1ne to appraise the situation, and does not give 
him time to apply the brakes and bring his vehicle to a 
stop. 
In terms of distance, the defendant's truck, traveling 
at the same speed as the assumed speed of the Jeep, that 
is 45 miles per hour, would be the same distance from the 
point of impact as the Jeep, 145-120 feet, which under the 
evidence would not give him the 180 feet which it was 
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testified it would require for him to bring his vehicle to 
a stop. 
Nor should the court overlook the testimony of Dr. 
Harris to the effect that in a situation such as faced the 
defendant driver in this case, the defendant would need 
two or three seconds in which to appraise the situation 
and to determine upon a cause of action in addition to 
what is termed reaction time. This is not the simple situa-
tion in which a driver suddenly finds an obstacle in his 
path. In such a situation, the driver may be able to react 
immediately. In this case the defendant driver had to 
first determine the course the other vehicle would take 
before he himself could decide what to do about it. What 
may have appeared to have been the wisest course had 
the Jeep remained on its own side of the highway may 
not so have appeared when the Jeep cut over onto the 
wrong side of the highway. While there may be a ques-
tion in some situations as to whether a driver would re-
quire any time to appraise the situation, judgment time, 
there can be no such question here. 
To state the proposition differently, the defendant 
driver in this case could not have been expected to act to 
prevent the collision until such time as it became appar-
ent to him what course the Jeep was going to take and 
until it came over onto his side of the road. Even under 
the assumptions engaged in by the plaintiff, the defend-
ant had no clear opportunity to avoid the collision. The 
plain and simple fact is that we have two vehicles ap-
proaching each other from opposite directions on a two-
lane highway. The driver of one of the vehicles for some 
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unknown reason suddenly lost control of his automobile 
and turned directly into the path of the other on-coming 
vehicle. This aet ion and this alone was the proximate 
cause of the collision. 
The last clear chance is an opportunity which is 
available to the defendant, and in order to judge that op-
portunity, we must place ourselves in the position of de-
fendant driver as he can1e downhill on that fateful day 
of October 19, 1951, toward the Red Creek bridge. As 
he approached the bridge, the pickup truck, driven by 
Francis A. Howard, approached the bridge from the 
opposite direction. In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we rnay assume that there was nothing about 
the way in which the pickup truck was driven to put 
the defendant driver on notice of any pending disaster. 
The pickup truck reached the bridge first and upon cross-
ing the same, struck the side of the bridge, but continued 
off the bridge and on up the highway on its own side of 
the road for a period of 80-100 feet. The defendant 
driver, and we must keep in mind that he was handling 
;J a truck loaded with explosives which required the utmost 
of care on his part for his own safety and the safety of 
others on the highway, was entitled to assume that the 
pickup truck would remain on its own side and was not 
required to rnake a violent application of brakes, thereby 
endangering himself and Francis and Allen Howard; that 
is, if he had time to apply his brakes, which appears ex-
tremely doubtful. As the pickup truck cut diagonally 
across the highway, the defendant was faced with a 
number of questions and decisions. Would the driver 
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of the pickup truck turn back in to his own side of the 
highway 1 Would he pass in front of the defendant's 
truck and off the highway~ Should he turn his truck 
to the left and onto the wrong side of the highway, and if 
he did, would the pickup truck cut back to that side of 
the highway1 Should he apply his brakes and attempt 
to stop his vehicle¥ Should he turn to the right and at-
tempt to avoid the pickup~ 
All of these questions and his course of conduct had 
to be resolved within the time it took the pickup truck to 
travel from the point where it first crossed over onto the 
north side of the road to the point of impact. And, it is 
apparent at that point, there was nothing the defendant 
driver could have done to avoid the accident. 
Looking back at the accident, and having the advan-
tage of knowing what course the Jeep did pursue to the 
point of impact, it is easy for us now to theorize that the 
defendant driver may have done something which he did 
not do to avoid the accident. Whether such course of con-
duct would have avoided the accident still remains in 
the field of speculation. There is no evidence in this case 
that the defendant driver had had any opportunity to 
avoid the accident after he became aware of the position 
of peril which Francis A. Howard and Allen Howard 
had been placed in by the conduct of Francis A. Howard. 
It is not for us now to engage in certain unwarranted as-
sumptions to make it appear that the defendant by hind-
sight could have avoided the collision, nor is it proper to 
place upon the defendant the burden of showing from 
the evidence that he could not have avoided the collision, 
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when it does not appear fr01n any evidence in the case, 
no matter how '"e construe it, that he could have avoided 
the collision. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ANY NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT. 
~lueh of the brief of the appellant is devoted to his 
discussion of the duty of the defendant to turn his auto-
mobile to the right, stop his automobile, or otherwise act 
to avoid the collision. It is not contended that if the de-
fendant driver had had a cl~ar opportunity to have avoid-
ed this accident by any reasonable course of conduct that 
he should be excused from his failure to do so. The plain 
and simple fact is that the evidence fails to disclose any-
thing which the defendant might have done in the time 
that he had to act which would have avoided the accident. 
The physical evidence shows that the defendant did not 
deliberately or heedlessly drive his vehicle into that 
driven by Francis A. Howard. On the contrary, the evi-
:1 dence shows that even within the limited time available, 
~~1 he had attempted to avoid the collision with the Howard 
vehicle. 
:~ The point of impact between the two vehicles was 
~ near the north edge of the oiled portion of the highway 
rr: (R. 26). The right wheels of the defendant's vehicle left 
1." the oiled portion of the highway at about the point of im-
nfr pact and traveled along the north shoulder of the high-
roo way, the entire vehicle eventually passing off the oiled 
~ surface and coming to rest about 25 feet off the highway 
:~I (R. 25). This indicates that · the driver had already 
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turned his vehicle to the right at the time of the impact. 
It is also the evidence that the defendant's vehicle was 
brought to a stop within a distance of 135 feet, (R. 25) 
and l<·ft marks on the north shoulder indicating the ap-
plication of brakes. Applying the formula that it would 
take a total of 180 feet, including reaction time, to stop the 
defendant's vehicle and 130 feet after the application of 
brakes, it would appear that the defendant had already 
determined to apply his brakes, and applied them at about 
the point of impact. Of course, after leaving the highway, 
defendant's vehicle did pass over some boulders which 
may have had some effect in slowing the vehicle. But, 
the evidence does indicate that the defendant driver was 
doing his best within the time available to avoid the 
accident by applying his brakes and turning to the right. 
Of course, it may be that if the defendant had de-
termined on some other course of action, he may have 
avoided the accident. This is entirely speculative, but 
even should we determine that such is the case, the de-
fendant would not necessarily be negligent for not taking 
such a course of action. A person suddenly confronted 
with unexpected danger is only expected to use such 
means for avoiding that danger as would appeal to a 
person of ordinary prudence in a similar situation. As 
long as he acts 'as a reasonable and prudent person, he is 
not obligated to choose that particular course of action 
which would have avoided the accident. We must re-
member that looking back at an accident, it may be poss-
ible to outline a course of conduct which it may appear 
would have avoided the accident. But, the person who is 
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I 
confronted with the danger at the time of the accident 
does not have the opportunity for calm reflective think-
ing upon the subject. He n1ust deter1nine smne course 
of action instantaneously. .Moreover, in looking back at 
the accident, we have the advantage of seeing what the 
other driver actually did, whereas the person confronted 
with the situation must predict the other driver's actions. 
The appellant now arg·ues that had the defendant driver 
driven the truck 5 or 6 feet to the left, he could have 
avoided the accident. There is no showing that the de-
fendant had sufficient time to make such a maneuver in 
the first place. In the second place, the pickup truck was 
coming toward his truck from the left side of the vehicle 
and it only appears reasonable that he should move to 
the right, rather than to the left in order to escape the 
collision. In the third place, the defendant driver could 
not anticipate that Francis A. Howard would not return 
to his own side of the highway, but may have expected 
him to do so. Of course, if Francis A. Howard had re-
turned to his own side of the highway, then the defend-
ant, had he turned to the left, would have made the acci-
dent a certainty. 
In the case of lJ!lorrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 130, the 
defendant observed another vehicle approaching his ve-
hicle on the wrong side of the highway at a distance of 
about 225 feet. Both vehicles were approaching each 
other at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour. The defendant 
turned his vehicle to the left, in order to avoid the colli-
sion; at about the same time, the plaintiff returned to his 
own side of the road. The two cars collided head-on on 
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the plaintiff's side of the road. 
In its opinion the court quoted with approval Mc-
Phee v. Lavin, 183 (Calif.) 264-191 P 23, as follows: 
"One suddenly confronted with an unexepcted 
danger may use such means for avoiding the dan-
ger as would appeal to a person of ordinary pru-
dence in a like situation without being held to 
strict accountability as to whether the course 
chosen is the most judicious or not." 
As stated by Blashfield in Cyclopedia of Automo .. 
bile Law and Practice, Vol. 1 Part 2, Page 553: 
"When two alternatives are presented to a 
traveler on a highway as means of escape from a 
collision, either of which might fairly be chosen 
by a reasonably prudent person, the law will not 
hold him guilty of negligence in taking either, even 
though he does not make the wiser choice, espe-
cially where there is only time for instinctive ac-
tion, since he is not bound to use an infallible judg-
ment as to the course to pursue to avoid a colli-
sion, but only to exercise that degree of care which 
an ordinary prudent person would have taken." 
The evidence in this case fails to disclose that the 
driver of the defendant's truck failed to do anything in 
the limited time available which might reasonably have 
been expected of him to avoid the collision in this case. 
In fact, the evidence discloses that he did everything with-
in his power to avoid the collision. 
CONCLUSION 
The sole proximate cause of the accident out of which 
this action arose was that the Jeep driven by Francis 
A. I-Ioward for some unexplained reason collided with the 
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side of the bridg-e and then cut ovPr onto the wrong side 
of the highway into the path of defendant's vehicle. The 
whole sequence of the accident occurred over the 1natter 
of a Yery few seconds. After striking the bridge, the 
Jeep continued on do·wn the shoulder on its proper side 
of the highway for eighty to a hundred feet where it cut 
across the highway 143 to 125 feet where the impact oc-
curred. Frmn the tin1e the Jeep hit the bridge Ul;ltil the 
Jeep cut across the highway, the defendant driver was 
entitled to assu1ne the Jeep would remain on its proper 
side of the road. He could not have been expected to anti-
cipate that it would suddenly cut over onto the wrong 
side of the highway, and until it did so, could not frame 
a course of conduct upon that premise. 
Yiewing the facts upon any theory, there is no show-
ing that the defendant driver had a clear opportunity 
to avoid the collision. The defendant driver turned his 
vehicle to the right and brought his vehicle, which had 
been traveling at 45 n;tiles per hour, to a stop within 135 
feet from the point of impact, indicating that he did 
everything within his power and which might reasonably 
be expected of him to avoid the collision. 
Appellant in his brief theorizes on what the defend-
ant Inay have failed to do to avoid the accident. His argu-
ment is based on speculation and conjecture, assumes 
facts which are not in the evidence, and eli1ninates other 
facts which are in the evidence and must be taken into 
account. 
Perhaps the best summation is that given by the 
Trial Judge in directing a verdict in favor of defendant: 
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"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlernen of the 
jury, the attorneys for the defendants in this case 
have made a motion at the end of the plaintiff's 
case for a dismissal and they make the motion that 
there has been no showing that the truck driver 
was guilty of any act of negligence upon his part. 
And we do have in this State a doctrine of what is 
known as the last clear chance. In other words, 
as I explained to you the other day, if the plaintiff 
himself, like 1\ir. Howard, is guilty of contributory 
negligence he cannot recover. Of course that 
doesn't apply to the boy who was riding with him 
as a guest because he isn't chargeable with Mr. 
Howard, Sr.'s negligence, but in order to hold the 
defendants in this case the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof of showing that Mr. Byington did 
something, or failed to do something, that a rea-
sonably prudent man would have or would not 
have done, and I think the evidence is quite clear 
that under the circumstances here this thing hap-
pened so fast and under such conditions that Mr. 
Byington didn't have any opportunity to do any-
thing different than what he did do and that he 
didn't fail to do something that a reasonably pru-
dent man could have done. 
"Now these are unfortunate things and, of 
course, these obligations come to you and they 
come to me, but I have seen fit that at this stage 
of the proceeding I ought not to waste your time 
or the time of these litigants in further proceeding 
with this case because I am satisfied that the 
plaintiff, unfortunate as this situation is and 
tragic as it is, has not made in law what would 
amount to a responsibility on the part of Mr. By-
ington. 
"Of course, Mr. Byington being the driver of 
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the truck, he is the one we look to see what he 
should have done or didn't do and the Ringsby 
people they would only be liable if Mr. Byington 
is liable. So far as Ringsby is concerned we only 
impute the negligence of Mr. Byington, if any, 
to them and I am satisfied that there is not here 
in the law sufficient to submit to you for your 
deliberation and for that reason I have decided 
that I am required as a part of rny duty to grant 
this motion that the defendants have made and, 
that being the case, the motion is granted and your 
services won't be further needed in this matter 
and I want to thank you for your attention here 
and you will be excused until you are called again 
in another case. The court will be in recess." 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
REX J. HANSON 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, Jr. 
DON J. HANSON 
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